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Discount rate variation is the central organizing question of current asset pricing research. I survey
facts, theories and applications.  We thought returns were uncorrelated over time, so variation in price-dividend
ratios was due to variation in expected cashflows. Now it seems all price-dividend variation corresponds
to discount-rate variation. We thought that the cross-section of expected returns came from the CAPM.
Now we have a zoo of new factors. I categorize discount-rate theories based on central ingredients
and data sources. Discount-rate variation continues to change finance applications, including portfolio
theory, accounting, cost of capital, capital structure, compensation, and macroeconomics.
John H. Cochrane
Booth School of Business
University of Chicago
5807 S. Woodlawn
Chicago, IL  60637
and NBER
john.cochrane@chicagobooth.eduI. Introduction
Asset prices should equal expected discounted cashﬂows. 40 years ago, Gene Fama (1970)
argued that the expected part, “testing market eﬃciency,” provided the framework for orga-
nizing asset-pricing research in that era. I argue that the “discounted” part better organizes
our research today.
I start with facts: How discount rates vary over time and across assets. I turn to theory,
why discount rates vary. I’ll attempt a categorization based on central assumptions and
links to data, analogously to Fama’s “weak” “semi-strong” and “strong” forms of eﬃciency.
Finally, I point to some applications, which I think will be strongly inﬂuenced by our new
understanding of discount rates. In each case, I have more questions than answers. This
paper is more of an agenda than a summary.
A na p o l o g y :I nt h ea v a i l a b l es p a c eIc a n n o te v e nc i t el e ta l o n er e v i e wa l lt h ed e s e r v i n g
literature, or trace the development of all these ideas. Even my long reference list only gives
examples of relevant work.
II. Time-series facts
A. Simple DP regression
Discount rates vary over time. (“Discount rate” “risk premium” and “expected return” are
all the same thing here.) Start with a very simple regression of returns on dividend yields,1
shown in Table I.
Horizon   t()R 2 [()]
[()]
()
1y e a r 3.8 (2.6) 0.09 5.46 0.76
5y e a r s 20.6 (3.4) 0.28 29.3 0.62
Table I. Return-forecasting regressions 
→+ = +×++.A n n u a l
data, CRSP value-weighted return less three-month Treasury return 1947-2009.
The ﬁve-year regression t statistic uses the Hansen-Hodrick (1983) correction.
[()] stands for (ˆ  × ).
The one-year regression forecast doesn’t seem that important. Yes, the t statistic is
“signiﬁc a n t , ”b u tt h e r ea r el o t so fb i a s e sa n dﬁs h i n g .T h en i n ep e r c e n t2 isn’t impressive.
In fact, this regression has huge economic signiﬁcance. First, the coeﬃcient estimate is
large. One percentage point more dividend yield forecasts nearly four percentage points
more return. Prices rise by an additional three percentage points.
1Fama and French (1988).
1Second, ﬁve and a half percentage point variation in expected returns is a lot. A six-
percent equity premium was already a “puzzle.”2 The regression implies that expected re-
turns vary by at least as much as their puzzling level.
By contrast, 2 is a poor measure of economic signiﬁcance in this context3. The economic
question is “How much do expected returns vary over time?” There will always be lots of
unforecastable return movement, so the variance of ex-post returns isn’t a very informative
comparison for this question.
Third, the slope coeﬃcients and 2 rise with horizon. Figure 1 plots each year’s dividend
yield along with the subsequent seven years of returns. Read the dividend yield as prices
upside down: prices were low in 1980 and high in 2000. The picture then captures the central
fact: High prices, relative to dividends, have reliably led to many years of poor returns. Low
prices have led to high returns.












Figure 1: Dividend yield (multiplied by 4) and following annualized 7-year return. CRSP
value-weighted market index.
B. Present values, volatility, bubbles, and long-run returns
Long horizons are interesting, really, because they tie predictability to volatility, “bubbles,”
and the nature of price movements. I make that connection via the Campbell-Shiller (1988)











2Mehra and Prescott (1985).
3Campbell (1991) makes this point, noting that a perpetuity would have very low short-run 2
2where  ≡ − =l o g ( ), +1 ≡ log,a n d ≈ 096 is a constant of approximation.
See the Appendix for details.
If we run regressions of weighted long-run returns and dividend growth on dividend yields,





















−1+ =  + 
()






−1∆+ =  + 
()
  + 

+
+ =  + 
()
  + 

+ (4)
If we lived in an i.i.d. world, dividend yields would never vary in the ﬁrst place. Expected
future returns and dividend growth would never change. If dividend yields vary at all, they
must forecast long-run returns, long-run dividend growth, or a “rational bubble” of ever
higher prices.
The regression coeﬃcients in (2) can be read as the fractions of dividend yield variation



















 ( +) (5)








Direct regression ,  =1 5 1.01 -0.11 -0.11
Implied by VAR,  =1 5 1.05 0.27 0.22
VAR,  = ∞ 1.35 0.35 0.00





  + 
+. Annual data 1947-2009. “Direct” estimates are based on
15-year ex-post returns. The “VAR” estimates infer long-run coeﬃcients from
one-year coeﬃcients, using estimates in the right-hand panel of Table III. (See
the Appendix for details.)
3The long-run return coeﬃcients are all a bit larger than 1.0. The dividend-growth fore-
casts are small, insigniﬁcant, and positive point estimates go the “wrong” way — high prices
relative to current dividends signal low future dividend growth. The 15-year dividend-yield
forecast coeﬃcient is also essentially zero, and has the “wrong” sign as well.
Thus the estimates say that all price-dividend ratio volatility corresponds to variation in
expected returns. None corresponds to variation in expected dividend growth, and none to
“rational bubbles.”
In the 1970s, we would have guessed exactly the opposite pattern. On the idea that
returns are not predictable, we would have supposed that high prices relative to current
dividends reﬂect expectations that dividends will rise in the future, and so forecast higher
dividend growth. That pattern is completely absent. Instead, high prices relative to current
dividends entirely forecast low returns.
This is the true meaning of return forecastability.4 This is the real measure of “how
big” the point estimates are — return forecastability is “just enough” to account for price
volatility. This is the natural set of units with which to evaluate return forecastability.
What we expected to be 0 is 1; what we expected to be 1 is 0.
Table II also reminds us that the point of the return-forecasting project is to understand
prices,t h eright hand variable of the regression. We put return on the left because the
forecast error is uncorrelated with the forecasting variable. That choice does not reﬂect
“cause” and “eﬀect,” nor does it imply that the point of the exercise is to understand ex-
post return variation.
How you look at things matters. The long-run and short-run regressions are mathemat-
ically equivalent. Yet one transformation shows an unexpected economic signiﬁcance. We
will see this lesson repeated many times.
(Table II does not include standard errors, and sampling variation in long-run estimates
is an important topic.5 My point is the economic importance of estimates. One might still
argue that we can’t reject the alternative views. But when point estimates are 1 and 0,
arguing we should believe 0 and 1 because that view can’t be rejected is a tough sell.
The variance of dividend yields or price-dividend ratios corresponds entirely to discount-
rate variation, but as much as half of the variance of price changes ∆+1 = −+1 +  +
∆+1 or returns +1 ≈− +1++∆+1 corresponds to current dividends ∆+1.T h i s
fact seems trivial but has caused a lot of confusion.
I divide by dividends for simplicity, to capture a huge literature in one example. Many
other variables work about as well, including earnings and book values.)
4Shiller (1981), Campbell and Shiller (1988), Campbell and Ammer (1993), Cochrane (1991a), (1992),
(1994) and review in (2005c).
5See Cochrane (2006) and its references.
4C. A pervasive phenomenon
This pattern of predictability is pervasive across markets. For stocks, bonds, credit spreads,
foreign exchange, sovereign debt and houses, a yield or valuation ratio translates one-for-one
to expected excess returns, and does not forecast the cashﬂow or price change we may have
expected. In each case our view of the facts have changed 100% since the 1970s.
• Stocks. Dividend yields forecast returns, not dividend growth.6
• Treasuries. A rising yield curve signals better one-year return for long-term bonds, not
higher future interest rates. Fed fund futures signal returns, not changes in the funds
rate.7
• Bonds. Much variation of credit spreads over time and across ﬁr m so rc a t e g o r i e ss i g n a l s
returns not default probabilities.8
• Foreign exchange. International interest rate spreads signal returns, not exchange-rate
depreciation.9
• Sovereign debt. High levels of sovereign or foreign debt signal low returns, not higher
government or trade surpluses.10
• Houses. High price/rent ratios signal low returns, not rising rents or prices that rise
forever.
Since houses are so much in the news, Figure 2 shows house prices and rents, and Table III
presents a regression. High prices relative to rents mean low returns, not higher subsequent
rents, or prices that rise forever. The housing regressions are almost the same as the stock
market regressions. (Not everything about house and stock data is the same of course.
Measured house price data are more serially correlated.)
Houses Stocks
  2   2
+1 0.12 (2.52) 0.15 0.13 (2.61) 0.10
∆+1 0.03 (2.22) 0.07 0.04 (0.92) 0.02
+1 0.90 (16.2) 0.90 0.94 (23.8) 0.91
Table III. Left: Regressions of log annual housing returns +1,l o gr e n tg r o w t h
∆+1 and log rent/price ratio +1 o nt h er e n t / p r i c er a t i o, +1 =  +
 ×  + +1 1960-2010. Right: Regressions of log stock returns +1, dividend
growth ∆+1 and dividend yields +1 on dividend yields ,a n n u a lC R S P
value weighted return data 1947-2010.
6Fama and French (1988), (1989).
7Fama and Bliss (1987), Campbell and Shiller (1991), Piazzesi and Swanson (2008).
8Fama (1986), Duﬃe and Berndt (2011).
9Hansen and Hodrick (1980), Fama (1984).
10Gourinchas and Rey (2007).
























Figure 2: House prices and rents. OFHEO is the Oﬃce of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight "purchase-only" price index. CSW are Case-Shiller-Weiss price data. Data from
http://www.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/land-values/rent-price-ratio.asp
There is a strong common element and a strong business cycle association to all these
forecasts.11 Low prices and high expected returns hold in “bad times,” when consumption,
output and investment are low, unemployment is high, businesses are failing, and vice versa.
These facts bring a good deal of structure to the debate over “bubbles” and “excess
volatility.” High valuations correspond to low returns, and associated with good economic
conditions. All a “price bubble” can possibly mean now is that the equivalent discount
rate is “too low” relative to some theory. Regressions do not establish causality. But this
equivalence channels us to a much more proﬁtable discussion.
D .T h em u l t i v a r i a t ec h a l l e n g e
This empirical project has only begun. We see that one variable at a time forecasts one
return at a time. We need to understand their multivariate counterparts, on both the left
and right hand sides of the regressions.
For example the stock and bond regressions on dividend yield and yield spread ()a r e

stock





+1 =  +  ×  + 

+1
We have some additional predictor variables , from similar univariate or at best bivariate
11Fama and French (1989).
6(hence [+ × ])e x p l o r a t i o n s ,

stock
+1 =  [+ × ]+ ×  + 

+1
First, then, which of these variables are really important in a multiple regression sense?
In particular, do the variables that forecast one return forecast another?

stock










(I put the variables we need to learn about in boxes.)
Second, how correlated are the right-hand terms of these regressions? What is the factor
structure of time-varying expected returns? Expected returns (
+1) vary across time ;
how correlated is such variation across assets and asset classes , and how can we best express
that correlation as factor structure? As an example to clarify the question, suppose we ﬁnd
the stock return coeﬃcients are all double those of the bonds,

stock





+1 =  +1×  +2×  + 

+1
We would see a one-factor model for expected returns, with stock expected returns always




























As a small step down this road, Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) (2008) ﬁnd that forward
rates of all maturities help to forecast returns of each maturity — multiple regressions matter
as in (6). We found that the right-hand sides are almost perfectly correlated across left-hand
maturities.12 A single common factor describes 99.9% of the variance of expected r e t u r n sa si n
(7). Finally, we ﬁnd that the spread in time-varying expected bond returns across maturities
corresponds to a spread in covariances with a single “level” factor, and the market prices of
risk of slope, curvature, and expected-return factors are zero.
What similar patterns hold across broad asset classes? The challenge, of course, is that
there are too many right hand variables, so we can’t just go run huge multiple regressions.
But these are the vital questions.
12Hansen and Hodrick (1983) and Stambaugh (1988) ﬁnd similar structures.
7E. Multivariate prices
I advertised much of the point of running return regressions with prices on the right hand
side was to understand those prices. How will a multivariate investigation change our picture
of prices and long-run returns?










provides a useful way to think about these questions. Since this identity holds ex-post,
it holds for any information set. Dividend yields are a great forecasting variable because
they reveal market expectations of dividend growth and returns. However, dividend yields
combine the two sources of information. A variable can help the dividend yield to forecast
long-run returns if it also forecasts long-run dividend growth. A variable can also help to
predict one year returns +1 without much changing long-run expected returns, if it has an
oﬀsetting eﬀect on longer-run returns {+}. Such a variable signals a change in the term
s t r u c t u r eo fr i s kp r e m i a{+}.
I examine Lettau and Ludvigson’s (2001a) (2005) consumption to wealth ratio cay as an
example to explore these questions. Table IV presents forecasting regressions
Coeﬃcients t-statistics Other statistics
    2 [(+1)]%
[(+1)]
(+1)
+1 0.12 0.071 (2.14) (3.19) 0.26 8.99 0.91
∆+1 0.024 0.025 (0.46) (1.69) 0.05 2.80 0.12
+1 0.94 -0.047 (20.4) (-3.05) 0.91








=1 −1∆+ 0.29 0.033 0.12
Table IV. Forecasting regressions using dividend yield and consumption-wealth
ratio, 1952-2009, annual data. Long-run coeﬃcients are computed using a ﬁrst-
order VAR with  and  as state variables. Each regression includes a
constant. Cay is rescaled so ()=1 . ()=0 42.
Cay helps to forecast one-period returns. The t statistic is large, and it raises the variation
of expected returns substantially. Cay only marginally helps to forecast dividend growth.
(Lettau and Ludvigson report that it works better in quarterly data.)
Figure 3 graphs the one-year return forecast using dp alone, the one-year return forecast
using dp and cay together, and the actual ex-post return. Adding cay lets us forecast
business-cycle frequency “wiggles” while not much changing the “trend.”














Figure 3: Forecast and actual 1 year returns. The forecasts are ﬁtted values of regressions
of returns on dividend yield and cay. Actual returns are plotted on the same date as their
forecast, i.e. +1 is plotted at the same date as  +  × .














Figure 4: Dividend yield dp and forecasts of long-run returns
P∞
=1 −1+Return forecasts
are computed from a VAR including dp, and a VAR including dp and cay.
Long-run return forecasts are quite diﬀerent. Figure 4 contrasts long-run return forecast
with and without cay. Though cay has a dramatic eﬀect on one-period return +1 forecasts
in Figure 3, cay has almost no eﬀect at all on long-run return
P∞
=1 −1+ forecasts in
Figure 4.
Figure 4 includes the actual dividend yield, to show (by (8)) how dividend yields break
into long-run return vs. dividend growth forecasts. The last two rows of Table IV give the
corresponding long-run regression coeﬃcients. Essentially all price-dividend variation still
9corresponds to expected-return forecasts.
How can cay forecast one-year returns so strongly, but have such a small eﬀect on the
terms of the dividend-yield present value identity? In the context of (8), cay alters the term
structure of expected returns.
We can display this behavior with impulse-response functions. Figure 5 plots responses
to a dividend growth shock, a dividend yield shock, and a cay shock. In each case, I include
a contemporaneous return response to satisfy the return identity +1 = ∆+1−+1+.






























































































Figure 5: Response functions to dividend growth, dividend yield, and cay shocks. Cal-
culations are based on the VAR of Table 4. Each shock changes the indicated vari-
able without changing the others, and includes a contemporaneous return shock +1 =
∆+1 − +1 + . The vertical dashed line indicates the period of the shock.
These plots answer the question, “what change in expectations corresponds to the given
shock?” The dividend growth shock corresponds to permanently higher expected dividends
with no change in expected returns. Prices jump to their new higher value and stay there. It
is a pure “expected cashﬂow” shock. The dividend yield shock is essentially a pure discount
rate shock. It shows a rise in expected returns with little change in expected dividend growth.
The cay shock in the rightmost panel of Figure 5 corresponds to a shift in expected
returns from the distant future to the near future, with a small similar movement in the
timing of a dividend growth forecast. It has almost no eﬀect on long run returns or dividend
10growth. We could label it a shock to the term structure of risk premia.13
So, cay strongly forecasts one-year returns, but has little eﬀect on price-dividend ratio
variance attribution. Does this pattern hold for other return forecasters? I don’t know.
In principle, consistently with the identity (8), other variables can help dividend yields to
predict both long-run returns and long-run dividend growth. Consumption and dividends
should be cointegrated, and since dividends are so much more volatile, the consumption-
dividend ratio should forecast long-run dividend growth. Cyclical variables should work: at
the bottom of a recession, both discount rates and expected growth rates are likely to be
high, with oﬀsetting eﬀects on dividend yields. Reﬂecting both ideas, Lettau and Ludvigson
(2005) report that “cdy” a cointegrating vector including dividends, does forecast long-run
dividend growth in just this way. However, the lesser persistence of typical forecasters will
work against much eﬀect on price-dividend ratios. Cay’s coeﬃcient of only 0.65 on its own
lag, and the fact that cay did not forecast dividend yields, are much of the story for cay’s
failure to aﬀect long-run forecasts.
Even so, if additional variables help to forecast long-run dividend growth, they can only
raise the contribution of long-run expected returns to price-dividend variation. It does not
shift variance attribution from returns do dividends. A higher long-run dividend forecast
must be matched by a higher long-run return forecast if it is not to aﬀect the dividend yield.
This is a suggestive ﬁrst step, not an answer. We have a smorgasbord of return forecasters
to investigate, singly and jointly, including information in additional lags of returns and
dividend yields (see the Appendix). The point is this: Multivariate long-run forecasts and
consequent price implications can be quite diﬀerent from one-period return forecasts. As we
pursue the multivariate forecasting question using the large number of additional forecasting
variables, we should look at pricing implications, not just focus on short-run 2 contests.
III. The Cross Section
In the beginning, there was chaos; practitioners thought one only needed to be clever to earn
high returns. Then came the CAPM. Every clever strategy to deliver high average returns
ended up delivering high market betas as well. Then anomalies erupted, and there was chaos
again. The “value eﬀect” was the most prominent anomaly.
Figure 6 presents Fama-French 10 book/market-sorted portfolios. Average excess returns
rise from growth (low book/market, “high price”) to value (high book/market, “low price”).
This fact would not be a puzzle if the betas also rose. But the betas are about the same for
all portfolios.
The absence of beta is really the heart of the value puzzle. It’s perfectly natural that
stocks which have fallen on hard times should have higher subsequent returns. If the market
declines, these stocks should be particularly hard hit. They should have higher average
returns — and higher betas. All puzzles are joint puzzles of expected returns and betas.
Beta without expected return is just as much a puzzle — and proﬁtable — as expected return
13For impulse-responses, see Cochrane (1994). For the eﬀect of cay, see Lettau and Ludvigson (2005).
11without beta.14
Fama and French (1993), (1996) brought order once again with size and value factors.




 =  +  ×  +  ×  + 
T h eF i g u r es h o w st h es e p a r a t ec o n t r i b u t i o n so f× () and × () in accounting
for average returns (). Higher average returns do line up well with larger values of the
 regression coeﬃcient

























Average returns and betas
Figure 6: Average returns and betas for Fama - French 10 Book/Market sorted portfolios.
Monthly data 1963-2010.
Fama and French’s factor model accomplishes a very useful data reduction. Theories
now only have to explain the hml portfolio premium, not the expected returns of individual
assets.15 This lesson has yet to sink in to a lot of empirical work, which still uses the 25
Fama French portfolios to test deeper models.
Covariance is in a sense Fama and French’s central result: if the value ﬁrms decline, they
all decline together. It’s a sensible result: Where there is mean, there must be comovement,
so that Sharpe ratios do not rise without limit in well-diversiﬁed value portfolios.16 But
theories now must also explain this common movement among value stocks. It is not enough
to simply generate temporary price movements, a “fad” that produces high or low prices, and
then fades away rewarding contrarians. You need all the low-price securities to subsequently
rise and fall together in the following month.
Finally, Fama and French found that other sorting variables, such as ﬁrm sales growth,
did not each require a new factor. The three-factor model took the place of the CAPM for
14Frazzini and Pedersen (2010).
15Daniel and Titman (2006), Lewellen, Nagel, and Shanken (2010).
16Ross (1976), (1978).
12routine risk-adjustment in empirical work.
Order to chaos, yes, but once again, the world changed 100%. None of the cross-section
of average stock returns corresponds to market betas. 100% corresponds to  (and size)
betas.
Alas, the world is once again descending into chaos. Expected return strategies have
emerged that do not correspond to market, value, and size betas. These include, among
many others, momentum17, accruals, equity issues and other accounting-related sorts,18 beta
arbitrage, credit risk, bond and equity market-timing strategies, foreign exchange carry trade,
put option writing, and various forms of “liquidity provision.”
A. The multidimensional challenge
We’re going to have to repeat Fama and French’s anomaly digestion, but with many more
dimensions. We have a lot of questions to answer:
First, which characteristics really provide independent information about average re-
turns? Which are subsumed by others?
Second, does each new anomaly variable also correspond to a new factor formed on those
same anomalies? Momentum returns correspond to regression coeﬃcients on a winner-loser
momentum “factor.” Carry-trade proﬁts correspond to a carry-trade factor.19 Do accruals
return strategies correspond to an accruals factor? We should routinely look.
Third, how many of these new factors are really important? Can we again account for 
independent dimensions of expected returns with  factor exposures? Can we account
for accruals return strategies by betas on some other factor, as with sales growth?
Now, factor structure is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for factor pricing. ICAPM and
consumption-CAPM models do not predict or require that the multiple pricing factors will
correspond to big common movements in asset returns. And big common movements, such as
industry portfolios, need not correspond to any risk premium. There always is an equivalent
single-factor pricing representation of any multifactor model, the mean-variance eﬃcient
portfolio. Still, the world would be much simpler if betas on only a few factors, important
in the covariance matrix of returns, accounted for a larger number of mean characteristics.
Fourth, eventually, we have to connect all this back to the central question of ﬁnance,
why do prices move?
B. Asset pricing as a function of characteristics/uniﬁcation
To address these questions in the zoo of new variables, I suspect we will have to use diﬀerent
methods. Following Fama and French, a standard methodology has developed: sort assets into
portfolios based on a characteristic, look at the portfolio means, especially the 1-10 portfolio
17Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).
18See Fama and French (2010).
19Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2010a).
13alpha, information ratio, and t-statistic, and then see if the spread in means corresponds to
a spread of portfolio betas against some factor. But we can’t do this with 27 variables.
Portfolio sorts are really the same thing as nonparametric cross sectional regressions,
using rather ineﬃcient non-overlapping histogram weights. Figure 7 illustrates the point.
For one variable, portfolio sorts and regressions both work. But we can’t chop portfolios 27
Log(Book/market)
E(R)






Figure 7: Portfolio means vs. cross -sectional regressions.
ways, so I think we will end up running multivariate regressions.20 (The Appendix gives a
simple cross-sectional regression to illustrate.)
Having said that, you see that “time series” forecasting regressions, “cross-sectional”
regressions and portfolio mean returns are really the same thing. All we are ever really
doing is understanding a big panel-data forecasting regression










where C denotes some big vector of characteristics,
 =[ size, b/m, momentum, accruals, d/p, credit spread....]
Is value a “time-series” strategy that moves in and out of a stock as that stock’s book/market
changes, or a “cross-sectional” strategy that moves from one stock to another following the
same signal? Well, both, obviously. They are the same thing. This is the managed-portfolio
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Once we understand expected returns, we have to see if expected returns line up with
covariances of returns with factors. Sorted-portfolio betas are a nonparametric estimate of






Parametric approaches are natural here as well, to address a multidimensional world. For








+1 =  + 
0 + 

+1 ⇒ ()= + 
0
(The errors may not be normal, but they are mean-zero and uncorrelated with the right




Underlying everything we’re doing is an assumption that expected returns, variances and
covariances are stable functions of characteristics, not (say) security name. That’s why we
use portfolios in the ﬁrst place. That is an incredibly useful assumption—or, fact about the
world. Without it, it’s hard to tell if there is any spread in average returns at all. It means
however, that asset pricing really is about the equality of two functions; the function relating
means to characteristics and the function relating covariance to characteristics.
Looking at portfolio average returns rather than forecasting regressions was really the
key to understanding economic importance of many eﬀects, as was looking at long-horizon
returns. For example, serial correlation with an 2 of 0.01 doesn’t seem that impressive. Yet
is enough to account for momentum: The last year’s winners went up 100%, so an annual
autocorrelation of 0.1, meaning 0.01 2, generates a 10% annual portfolio mean return.
(An even smaller amount of time-series cross-correlation works as well.) As another classic
example, Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2010a) translated carry-trade return-forecasting
regressions to means of portfolios formed on the basis of currency interest diﬀerentials. This
step led them to look for and ﬁnd a factor structure of country returns that depends on
interest diﬀerentials, a “high minus low” factor. This step followed Fama and French (1996)
exactly, but no one thought to look for it in 30 years of running country-by-country time-
series forecasting regressions
But the equivalence of portfolio sorts and regressions goes both ways. We can still calcu-
late these measures of economic signiﬁcance if we estimate panel-data regressions for means
and covariances. From the spread of lagged returns, we can calculate the momentum portfo-
lio implications directly. The 1-10 portfolio information ratio is the same thing as the Sharpe
ratio of the underlying factor, or t-statistic of the cross-sectional regression coeﬃcient. (See
the Appendix.) We could study the covariance structure of panel-data regression residuals as







Running multiple panel-data forecasting regressions is full of pitfalls of course. One
can end up focusing on tiny ﬁrms, or outliers. One can get the functional form wrong.
Uniting time-series and cross section will yield new insights as well. For example, variation
in book/market over time for a given portfolio has a larger eﬀect on returns than variation
15in book/market across the Fama-French portfolios, and a recent change in book/market also
seems to forecast returns. (See the Appendix.) I didn’t say it will be easy! But we must
address the factor zoo, and I don’t see how to do it by a high-dimensional portfolio sort.
C. Prices
Then, we have to answer the central question, what is the source of price variation?
When did our ﬁeld stop being “asset pricing” and become “asset expected returning?”
Why are betas exogenous?22 A lot of price variation comes from discount factor news. What
sense does it make to “explain” expected returns by the covariation of expected return shocks
with market expected return shocks? Market/book ratios should be our left-hand variable,
t h et h i n gw e ’ r et r y i n gt oexplain, not a sorting characteristic for expected returns.
Focusing on expected returns and betas rather than prices and discounted cashﬂows
makes sense in a two-period or i.i.d. world, since in that case betas are all cashﬂow betas.
It makes much less sense in a time-varying discount rate world.
A long-run, price-and-payoﬀ perspective may also end up being simpler. As a hint of the









So, long-run return uncertainty all comes from cashﬂow uncertainty. Long-run betas are all















+1 = ∆+1 − 
A natural start is to forecast long-run returns and form price decompositions in the cross






+ =  + 
0 + 

and then understand valuations with present value models as before.23 (The Appendix
includes two simple examples.)
In a formal sense, of course, it doesn’t matter whether you look at returns or prices.
1=(+1+1) and  = 
P∞
=1 ++ each imply the other. But, as I found with
return forecasts, our economic understanding may be a lot diﬀerent in a price, long-run
22Campbell and Mei (1993).
23Vuolteenaho (2002) and Cohen Polk and Vuolteenaho (2003) are a start, with too-few followers.
16view than focusing on short-run returns. What constitutes a “big” or “small” error is also
diﬀerent if we look at prices vs. returns. At a 2% dividend yield,  =(  − ) implies
that an “insigniﬁcant” 10bp/month expected return error is a “large” 12% price error, if it is
permanent. For example, since momentum amounts to a very small time-series correlation
and lasts less than a year, I suspect it has little eﬀect on long-run expected returns and
hence the level of stock prices. Long-lasting characteristics are likely to be more important.
Conversely, small transient price errors can have a large impact on return measures. A tiny
i.i.d. price error induces the appearance of mean reversion where there is none. Common
procedures amount to taking many diﬀerences of prices, which amplify the error/signal ratio.










 is already a triple-diﬀerence
of price data.
IV. Theories
Having viewed a bit of how discount rates vary, Let’s think now about why discount rates
vary so much.
A. A categorization, by ingredients and connection to data
It’s useful to classify theories by their main ingredient, and by which data they use to
measure discount rates. My goal is to produce for discount rates something like Fama’s
(1970) classiﬁcation of informational possibilities.
1. Theories based on fundamental investors, with few frictions.
(a) Macroeconomics — tie to macro data.
i. Consumption, Aggregate risks.
ii. Risk sharing/background risks (Hedging outside income)
iii. Investment and production.
iv. General equilibrium, including macroeconomics
(b) Behavioral; Irrational expectations. Tie to price data. Other data?
(c) Finance. Expected return-beta, return-based factors, aﬃne term structure mod-
els. Tie to price data, returns explained by covariances.
2. Theories based on frictions.
(a) Segmented markets — diﬀerent investors in diﬀerent markets; limited risk bearing
of active traders.
(b) Intermediated markets. Prices set by leveraged intermediaries; funding diﬃculties.
(c) Liquidity.
17i. Idiosyncratic — easy to sell the asset.
ii. Systemic — times of market illiquidity.
iii. Information trading — value of securities in facilitating information trading.
“Macro” theories tie discount rates to macroeconomic data, such as consumption or
investment, based on ﬁrst-order conditions for the ultimate investors or producers.
For example, the canonical consumption-based model with power utility relates discount















+1 +1) ≈ (

+1∆+1)
High expected returns (low prices) correspond to securities that pay oﬀ poorly when con-
sumption is low. This model combines frictionless markets, rational expectations and utility
maximization, and risk sharing so that only aggregate risks matter for pricing. It evidently
ties discount rate variation to macroeconomic data.
A vast literature has generalized this framework, including (among others)24 1) Nonsepa-
rability across goods — durable and nondurable25; traded and nontraded; 2) Nonseparability
over time, such as habit persistence,26 3) Recursive utility and long-run risks27 4) Rare
disasters, which alter measurements of means and covariances in “short” samples28.
A related category of theories adds incomplete markets or frictions preventing some
consumers from participating. Though they include “frictions,” I categorize such models
here because asset prices are still tied to some fundamental consumer or investor’s economic
outcomes. For example, if non-stockholders do not participate, we still tie asset prices to the
consumption decisions of stockholders who do participate.29
With incomplete markets, consumers still share risks as much as possible. The complete-




+1, becomes “all risks are shared as much as possible.” The projection of marginal
utility on asset payoﬀs  i st h es a m ea c r o s sp e o p l e(
+1|)=(

+1|) ≡ ∗.W e
can still aggregate marginal utility rather than aggregate consumption before constructing
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24See Cochrane (2007a), Ludvigson (2011) for recent reviews.
25Recently, Yogo (2006),
26Campbell and Cochrane (1999) for example.
27Epstein and Zin (1989), Bansal and Yaron (2004), Hansen, Heaton and Li (2008).
28Rietz (1988), Barro (2006).
29For example, Mankiw and Zeldes (1991).
18The fact that we aggregate nonlinearly across people means that variation in the distribution
of consumption matter to asset prices. Times in which there is more cross-sectional risk will
be high-discount factor events.30
Outside or nontradeable risks are a related idea. If a mass of investors has jobs or
businesses that will be hurt especially hard by a recession, they avoid stocks that fall more
than average in a recession.31 Average stock returns then reﬂect the tendency to fall more
in a recession, in addition to market risk exposure. Though in principle, given a utility
function, one could see such risks in consumption data, individual consumption data will
always be so poorly measured that tying asset prices to more fundamental sources of risk
m a yb em o r ep r o d u c t i v e .
If we ask the “representative investor” in December 2008 why he or she is ignoring the
high premiums oﬀered by stocks and especially ﬁxed income, the answer might well be “that’s
nice, but I’m about to lose my job, and my business might go under. I can’t take any more
risks right now, especially in securities that will lose value or become hard to sell if the
recession gets worse.” These extensions of the consumption-based model all formalize this
sensible intuition — as opposed to the idea that these consumers have wrong expectations,
or that they would have been happy to take risks but intermediaries were making all asset
pricing decisions for them.
Investment-based models link asset prices to ﬁrms investment decisions, and general equi-
librium models include production technologies and a speciﬁcation of the source of shocks.
This is clearly the ambitious goal towards which we are all aiming. The latter tries to answer
the vexing questions, where do betas come from? What makes a company a “growth” or
“value” company in the ﬁrst place?32
I think “behavioral” asset pricing’s central idea is that people’s expectations are wrong.33
It takes lessons from psychology to ﬁnd systematic patterns to the “wrong” expectations.
There are some frictions in many behavioral models, but these are largely secondary and
defensive, to keep risk-neutral “rational arbitrageurs” from coming in and undoing the be-
havioral biases. Often, simple risk aversion by the rational arbitrageurs would serve as well.
Behavioral models, like “rational” models, tie asset prices to the fundamental investor’s
willingness, ability or (in this case) perception of risk.
Behavioral theories are also discount-rate theories. A distorted probability with riskfree




















30Constantinides and Duﬃe (1996) .
31Fama and French (1996), Heaton and Lucas (2000).
32A few good examples: Gomes, Kogan and Zhang (2003), Gala (2010), Gourio (2007)..
33See Barberis and Thaler (2003) and Fama (1998) for reviews.
19 denote states of nature,  are true probabilities,  is a stochastic discount factor or
marginal utility growth, and ∗
 are distorted probabilities.
It is pointless to argue “rational” vs. “behavioral” in the abstract. There is a dis-
count rate and equivalent distorted probability that can rationalize any (arbitrage-free) data.
“The market went up, risk aversion must have declined” is as vacuous as “the market went
up, sentiment must have increased.” Any model only gets its bite by restricting discount
rates or distorted expectations, ideally tying them to other data. The only thing worth
arguing about is how persuasive those ties are in a given model and dataset, and whether it
w o u l dh a v eb e e ne a s yf o rt h et h e o r yt o“ p r e d i c t ”t h eo p p o s i t es i g ni ft h ef a c t sh a dc o m eo u t
that way.34 And the line between recent “exotic preferences” and “behavioral ﬁnance” is so
blurred35 it describes academic politics better than anything substantive.
A good question for any theory is what data it uses to tie down discount factors. By
and large, behavioral research so far largely ties prices to other prices; it looks for price
patterns that are hard to understand with other models, such as “overreaction” or “under-
reaction” to news. Some behavioral research uses survey evidence, and survey reports of
people’s expectations are certainly unsettling. However, surveys are sensitive to language
and interpretation. It doesn’t take long in teaching MBAs to realize that the colloquial
meanings of “expect” and “risk” are entirely diﬀerent from conditional mean and variance.
If people report the risk-neutral expectation, then expectations are in fact completely ratio-
nal. An “optimistic” cash-ﬂow growth forecast is the same as a “rational” forecast, already
discounted at a low rate, and leads to the correct decision, invest more. And the risk-neutral
expectation, i.e. the expectation weighted by marginal utility, is the right suﬃcient statistic
for many decisions. Treat painful things as if they were more probable than they are in fact.
Of course, “rational” theories beyond the simple consumption-based model struggle as
well. Changing expectations of consumption 10 years from now (long run risks) or chang-
ing probabilities of a big crash are hard to tell from changing “sentiment.” At least, one
can aim for more predictions than assumptions, tying together several phenomena with a
parsimonious speciﬁcation.
“Finance” theories tie discount rates to broad return-based factors. That’s great for
data reduction and practical applications. The more practical and “relative-pricing” the
application the more “factors” we accept on the right hand side. For example, in evaluating
a portfolio manager, hedging a portfolio, or ﬁnding the cost of capital for a given investment
we routinely include momentum as a “factor” even though we don’t have a deep theory of
why the momentum factor is priced.
However, we still need the deeper theories for deeper “explanation.” Even if the CAPM
explained individual mean returns from their betas and the market premium, we would still
have the equity premium puzzle — why is the market premium so large? (And why are
betas what they are?) Conversely, even if we had the perfect utility function and a perfect
consumption-based model, the fact that consumption data is poorly measured means we
34Fama (1998).
35For example, which of Epstein and Zin (1989), Barberis, Santos, and Huang (2001), Hansen and Sargent
(2005), Laibson (1997), Hansen, Heaton and Li (2008), and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) is really “rational”
and which is really “behavioral?”
20would still use ﬁnance models for most practical applications.36
A nice division of labor results. Empirical asset pricing in the Fama and French (1996)
tradition boils down the alarming set of anomalies to a small set of large-scale systematic
risks that generate rewards. “Macro” “behavioral” or other “deep” theories can then focus
on why the factors are priced.
Models that emphasize frictions are becoming more and more popular, especially since
the ﬁnancial crisis. At heart, these models basically maintain the “rational” assumption.
Admittedly, there are often “irrational” agents in such models. However, these agents are
usually just convenient shortcuts rather than central to the vision. A model may want some
large volume of trade,37 o rt oi n c l u d es o m e“ n o i s et r a d e r s , ”w h i l ef o c u s i n gc l e a r l yo nt h e
delegated management problem, or the problem of leveraged intermediaries. For such a
purpose, it’s easy to simply allude to a slightly irrational class of trader rather than spell
out their motives from ﬁrst principles. However those assumptions are not motivated by
deep reading of psychology or lab experiments. The focus is on the frictions and behavior of
intermediaries rather than the risk-bearing ability of ultimate investors, or their psychological
misperceptions.
I think it’s useful to distinguish three categories of frictions: 1) Segmented markets and
2) Intermediated markets or “institutional ﬁnance”38 and 3) Liquidity.
I distinguish “segmented markets” from “intermediated markets,” as shown in Figure 8.
Segmentation is really about limited risk sharing among the pool of investors active in a
particular market.39 They can generate “downward sloping demands,” and average returns
that depend on a “local” factor, little and poorly-linked CAPMs.40 Given the factor zoo,
that’s an attractive idea.
“Intermediated markets” or “institutional ﬁnance” refers to a diﬀerent, vertical rather
than horizontal, separation of investor from payoﬀ. Investors use delegated managers. Then,
agency problems in delegated management spill over into asset prices. For example, suppose
investors split their investments to the managers into “equity” and “debt” claims. When
losses appear, the managers stave oﬀ bankruptcy by trying to sell risky assets. But since all
the managers are doing the same thing, prices fall and discount rates rise. Colorful terms
like “ﬁre sale,” “liquidity spirals” describe this process.41
Of course, we have to document and explain segmentation and intermediation. As sug-
gested by the dashed arrows in Figure 8, there are strong incentives to undo any price
anomaly induced by segmentation or intermediation. Models with these frictions often ab-
stract from deep-pockets unintermediated investors — the sovereign wealth funds, pension
funds, endowments, family oﬃces, and Warren Buﬀets, or institutional innovation to bridge
36Campbell and Cochrane (2000) give a quantitative example.
37Scheinkman and Xiong (2003).
38Markus Brunnermeier coined this useful term.
39Some important examples: Burnnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Brunnermeier (2009), Gabaix, Krishna-
murthy and Vigneron (2007), Duﬃe and Strulovici (2011), Garleanu and Pedersen (2009), He and Krishna-
murthy (2010), Krishnamurthy (2008), Froot and O’Connell (2008), Vayanos and Vila (2011).
40For example, Gabaix, Krishnamurthy and Vigneron (2007).

















Figure 8: Segmented markets vs. intermediated markets.
the friction. Your “ﬁre sale” is their “buying opportunity.” Thus, I think a little more
attention to the reasons for segmentation and intermediation will help to deﬁne when and
how long these models apply. For example, transactions costs, attention costs, or limited
expertise suggest markets can be segmented until the “deep pockets” arrive, but that they
do arrive eventually. So if this is why markets are segmented, that segmentation will be
more important in the short run, after unusual events, or in more obscure markets. If I
try to sell a truckload of tomatoes at 2 am in front of the Booth school, I am not likely to
get full price. But if I do it every night, tomato buyers will start to show up. In the ﬂash
crash, it took about ten minutes for buyers to show up, which is either remarkably long or
remarkably short, depending on your point of view.
A crucial question is, as always, what data will this class of theories use to measure dis-
count rates? Arguing over puzzling patterns of prices is weak (the rational-behavioral debate
has been doing that for 40 years). Ideally, one should tie price or discount-rate variation to
central items in the models, such as the balance sheets of leveraged intermediaries, data on
who is actually active in segmented markets, and so forth. Yet such data is hard to ﬁnd.42
42Mitchell, Pedersen and Pulvino (2007) is a good example. They document who was active in convertible
arbitrage markets through two episodes in which the specialized hedge funds left the market and it took
months for the multi-strategy funds to move in.
22We have long recognized that some assets have higher or lower discount rates in compen-
sation for greater or lesser liquidity.43 We have also long struggled to deﬁne and measure
liquidity. There are (at least) three kinds of stories for liquidity that are worth distinguish-
ing. Liquidity can refer to the ease of buying and selling an individual security. Illiquidity
can also be systemic: assets will face a higher discount rate if their prices fall when the
market as a whole is illiquid, whether or not the asset becomes more or less illiquid. Fi-
nally, assets can have lower discount rates if they facilitate information trading, as money
facilitates physical trading.
I think of “liquidity” as diﬀerent from “segmentation” in that segmentation is about
limited risk-bearing ability, while liquidity is about trading. Liquidity is a feature of assets,
not the risks to which they are claims. Many theories of liquidity emphasize asymmetric
information, not limited risk-bearing ability — assets become illiquid when traders suspect
that anyone buying or selling knows something, not because traders are holding too much
of a well-understood risk. Understanding liquidity requires us to unravel the puzzle of why
people and institutions trade so vastly more than they do in our models.
All of these facts and theories are really about discount rates, expected returns, risk
bearing, risk sharing and risk premiums. None are fundamentally about slow or imperfect
diﬀusion of cash-ﬂow information, i.e. informational “ineﬃciency.” Informational eﬃciency
isn’t wrong or disproved. Eﬃciency basically won, and we moved on. When we see infor-
mation, it is quickly incorporated in asset prices. There is a lot of asset-price movement not
related to visible information, but Hayek (1945) told us that would happen, and we learned
that a lot of such price variation corresponds to expected returns. Little of the (large) gulf
b e t w e e nt h ea b o v em o d e l si sr e a l l ya b o u ti n f o r m a t i o n .S e e i n gt h ef a c t sa n dt h em o d e l sa s
categories of discount-rate variation seems much more descriptive of most (not all) theory
and empirical work.
Informational eﬃciency is much easier for markets and models to obtain than wide risk
sharing or desegmentation, which is perhaps why it holds more broadly. A market can
become eﬃcient with only one informed trader, who doesn’t need to actually buy anything
or take any risk. He should run in to a wall of indexers, and end up just bidding up the asset
he knows is underpriced.44 Though price discovery seems in reality to come with a lot of
trading, it doesn’t have to do so. Risk sharing needs everyone to change their portfolios and
bear a risk in order to eliminate segmentation. For example, if the small ﬁrm eﬀect came
from segmentation, the passively-managed small stock fund or total market fund should have
ended it — but it also took the invention and marketing of such funds to end it. The actions
of small numbers of arbitrageurs could not do so.
B. Recent performance
This is not the place for a deep review of theory and empirical work supporting or confronting
theories. Instead, I think it will be more productive to think informally about how these
43Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen (2005), Cochrane (2005b), Pastor and
Stambaugh (2003), Vayanos and Wang (2011).
44Milgrom and Stokey (1982).
23classes of models might be able to handle big recent events.
C. Consumption
Is t i l lt h i n kt h em a c r o - ﬁnance approach is promising. Figure 9 presents the market price-
dividend ratio, and aggregate consumption relative to a slow-moving “habit.” The habit is
basically just a long moving average of lagged consumption, so the surplus consumption ratio
line is basically detrended consumption.45
1990 1992 1995 1997 2000 2002 2005 2007 2010
Surplus consumption (C−X)/C and stocks
SPC (C−X)/C
P/D
Figure 9: Surplus consumption ratio and price/dividend ratio. Surplus consumption is
formed from real nondurable + services consumption using the Campbell and Cochrane
(1999) speciﬁcation and parameters. Price/dividend ratio is from the CRSP NYSE Value-
Weighted portfolio.
As you can see, consumption and stock market prices did both collapse in 2008. Many
high average-return-securities and strategies (stocks, mortgage-backed securities, low-grade
bonds, momentum, currency carry) collapsed more than low-average-return counterparts.
The basic consumption-model logic — securities must pay higher returns, or fetch lower
prices, if their values fall more when consumption falls — isn’t drastically wrong.
The habit model captures the idea that people become more risk averse as consumption
falls in recessions. As consumption nears habit, people are less willing to take risks that
involve the same proportionate risk to consumption. Discount rates rise, and prices fall.
Lots of models have similar mechanisms, especially models with leverage.46 In the habit
model, the price-dividend ratio is a nearly log-linear function of the surplus consumption
45Campbell and Cochrane (1999)
46For example, Longstaﬀ (2008).
24ratio. The ﬁt isn’t perfect, but the general pattern is remarkably good, given the hue and
cry about how the crisis invalidates all traditional ﬁnance.
D. Investment
The Q theory of investment is the oﬀ-the-shelf analogue to the simple power-utility model
from the producer point of view. It predicts that investment should be low when valuations








where  = investment and  = capital.














Figure 10: Investment/capital ratio, price/dividend ratio, and market/book ratio. Invest-
ment is real private nonresidential ﬁxed investment. Capital is cumulated from investment
with an assumed 10% annual depreciation rate. Price/dividend from CRSP, market/book
from Ken French’s website.
Figure 10 contrasts the investment/capital ratio, market/book ratio, and price/dividend
ratio. The simple Q theory also links asset prices and investment better than you probably
thought, both in the tech boom and the ﬁnancial crisis.
Many ﬁnance puzzles are stated in terms of returns. To make that connection, one can
transform (9) to a relation linking asset returns to investment growth. Many return puzzles
are mirrored in investment growth as the q theory suggests.47
47Cochrane (1991b), (1996) (2007a), Lamont (2000) Li, Livdan and Zhang (2008), Liu, Whithed and
Zhang (2009), Belo (2010), Jermann (2010), Liu and Zhang (2011).
25Q theory also reminds us that supply as well as demand matters in setting asset prices.
If capital could adjust freely, stock values would never change, no matter how irrational
investors are. Quantities would change instead.
I’m not arguing that consumption or investment caused the boom or the crash. Endowment-
economy causal intuition does not hold in a production economy. These ﬁrst-order conditions
are happily consistent with a view, for example, that rather small losses on subprime mort-
gages were ampliﬁed by a run on the shadow banking system and ﬂight to quality,48 which
certainly qualiﬁes as a “friction”. The ﬁrst-order conditions are consistent with many other
views of the fundamental determinants of both prices and quantities. But the graphs do
argue that asset prices and discount rates are much better linked to big macroeconomic
events than most people think (and vice versa). They suggest another important ampliﬁca-
tion mechanism: If people did not become more risk averse in recessions, and if ﬁrms could
quickly transform empty houses into hamburgers, asset prices would not have declined as
much.
I also don’t pretend to have perfect versions of either of these ﬁrst-order conditions, let
alone a full macro model that captures value or the rest of the factor zoo. These are very
simple and rejectable models. Each makes a 100% R2 prediction that is easy to formally
reject. The point is only that research and further elaboration of these kinds of models, as
well as using their basic intuition as an important guide to events, is not a hopeless endeavor.
E. Comparisons
Conversely, I think the other kinds of models, though good for describing particular anom-
alies, will have greater diﬃculty accounting for recent big-picture asset pricing events.
We see a pervasive, coordinated rise in the premium for systematic risk, common across
all asset classes, and present in completely unintermediated and unsegmented assets.49 For
example, Figure 11 plots government and corporate rates, and Figure 12 plots the baa-aaa
spread with stock prices. You can see a huge credit spread open up and fade away along
with the dip in stock prices.
Behavioral ideas — narrow framing, salience of recent experience, and so forth — are good
at generating anomalous prices and mean returns in individual assets or small groups. They
don’t easily generate this kind of coordinated movement that looks just like a rise in risk
premium. They don’t naturally generate covariance either. For example, “extrapolation”
generates the slight autocorrelation in returns that lies behind momentum. But why should
all the momentum stocks then rise and fall together the next month, just as if they are
exposed to a pervasive, systematic risk?
Finance models don’t help, of course, because we’re looking at variation of the factors
w h i c ht h e yt a k ea sg i v e n .
48Cochrane (2011)..
49The “systematic” adjective is important. People don’t seem to drive more carefully in recessions.


















Figure 11: BAA, AAA, and Treasury yields.















Figure 12: D/P, S&P500, BAA-AAA.
Segmented or institutional models aren’t obvious candidates to understand broad market
movements. Each of us can easily access stocks and bonds through low-cost indices.
And none of these models naturally describe the strong correlation of discount rates with
macroeconomic events. Is it a coincidence that people become irrationally pessimistic when
the economy is in a tailspin, and they could lose their jobs, houses, or businesses if systematic
events get worse?
27Again, macro isn’t everything — understanding the smaller puzzles is important. The
point is only that looking for macro underpinnings for discount rate variation, through fairly
simple models, isn’t as hopelessly anachronistic as many seem to think.
F. Arbitrages?
One of the nicest pieces of evidence for segmented or institutional views is that arbitrage
relationships were violated in the ﬁnancial crisis.50 Unwinding the arbitrage opportunities
required one to borrow dollars, which intermediary arbitrageurs could not do.
Figure 13 gives one example. CDS plus Treasury should equal a corporate bond, and
usually does. Not in the crisis.

















Figure 13: Citigroup CDS and Bond spreads. Source: Fontana (2010).
Figure 14 gives another example, covered interest parity. Investing in the US vs. investing
in Europe and returning the money with forward rates should yield the same thing. Not in
the crisis. In both cases, proﬁting from the arbitrage requires one to borrow dollars, which
was diﬃcult in the crisis.
Similar patterns happened in many other markets, including even US treasuries.51 Now,
any arbitrage opportunity is a dramatic event. But in each case here the diﬀerence between
the two ways of getting the same cashﬂow is dwarfed by the overall change in prices. And,
though an “arbitrage,” the price diﬀerences are not large enough to attract “long only” “deep
pocket” money. If your precious cash is in a US money market fund, 20 basis points in the
depth of a ﬁnancial crisis is not enough to get you to listen to the salesman oﬀering oﬀshore
investing with an exchange-rate hedging program.
50See also Fleckenstein, Longstaﬀ, and Lustig (2010),
51Hu, Pan and Wang (2011).













Figure 14: Three-month Libor and FX swap rate. Source: Baba and Packer (2009).
So maybe it’s possible that the “macro” view still builds the benchmark story of overall
price change, with very interesting spreads opening up due to frictions. At least we have a
theory for that. Constructing a theory in which the arbitrage spreads drive the coordinated
rise in risk premium seems much harder.
The price of coﬀee displays arbitrage opportunities across locations at the ASSA meetings.
(The AFA gave it away for free downstairs while Starbucks was selling it upstairs.) The
arbitrage reﬂects an interesting combination of transactions costs, short-sale constraints,
consumer biases, funding limits, and other frictions. Yet we don’t dream that this fact
matters for big-picture variation in worldwide commodity prices.
G. Liquidity premia; trading value
Trading-related liquidity does strike me as potentially important for the big picture, and a
potentially important source of the low discount rates in “bubble” events.52
I’m inspired by one of the most obvious “liquidity” premiums: Money is overpriced —
lower discount rate — relative to government debt, though they are claims to the same payoﬀ
in a frictionless market. And this liquidity spread can be huge — hundreds of percent in
hyperinﬂations.
Now, money is “special” for its use in transactions. But many securities are “special” in
trading. Trading needs a certain supply of their physical shares. We cannot support large
trading volumes by recycling one outstanding share at arbitrarily high speed. Even short
52Cochrane (2001), (2003), (2005b), Garber (2000), Krishnamurthy (2002), O’Hara (2008), Scheinkman
and Xiong (2003).
29sellers must hold a share for some short period of time.














Figure 15: Nasdaq Tech, Nasdaq, and NYSE indeces Source: Cochrane (2003).














Figure 16: Dollar volume in Nasdaq tech, Nasdaq, and NYSE. Source: Cochrane (2003).
When share supply is small, and trading demand is large, markets can drive down the
discount rate or drive up the price of highly-traded securities, as they do for money. These
eﬀects have long been seen in government bonds, for example in the Japanese “benchmark”
eﬀect, the spreads between on-the-run and oﬀ-the-run Treasuries, or the spreads between
Treasury and agency bonds.53 Could these eﬀects extend to other assets?
53Boudoukh and Whitelaw (1991), Longstaﬀ (2004), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010).
30Figures 15 and 16 are suggestive. The stock price raise and fall of the late 1990s was
concentrated in Nasdaq and Nasdaq Tech. The stock volume rise and fall was concentrated
i nt h es a m ep l a c e . Every asset price “bubble” — deﬁned here by people’s use of the label —
has coincided with a similar trading frenzy, from Dutch tulips in 1620 to Miami condos in
2006.
Is this a coincidence? Do prices rise and fall for other reasons, and large trading volume
follows, with no eﬀect on price? Or is the high price — equivalently a low discount rate —
explained at least in part by the huge volume; by the value of shares in facilitating a frenzy
of information trading?
To make this a deep theory, we must answer why people trade so much. Verbally, we
know the answer: The markets we study exist to support information-based trading. Yet,
we really don’t have good models of information-based trading.54 Perhaps the question how
information is incorporated in asset markets will come back to the center of inquiry.
V. Applications
Finance is about practical application, not just deep explanation. Discount rate variation
will change applications a lot.
A. Portfolio theory
A huge literature explores how investors should exploit the market-timing and intertemporal-
hedging opportunities implicit in time-varying expected returns.55
But the average investor must hold the market portfolio. We can’t all market-time, we
can’t all buy value, and we can’t all be smarter than average. We can’t even all rebalance.
No portfolio advice other than “hold the market” can apply to everyone. A useful and
durable portfolio theory must be consistent with this theorem. Our discount-rate facts and
theories suggest one, built on diﬀerences between people.
Consider Fama and French’s (1996) story for value. The average investor is worried
that value stocks will fall at the same time his or her human capital falls. But then some
investors (“steelworkers”) will be more worried than average, and should short value despite
the premium; some others (“tech nerds”) will have human capital correlated with growth
stocks and buy lots of value, eﬀectively selling insurance. A two-factor model implies a
three-fund theorem, a three-dimensional multifactor eﬃcient frontier as shown in Figure
17.56 I n v e s t o r sh a v ead i ﬃcult problem to ﬁgure out how much of three funds to hold.
And now we have dozens of such systematic risks for each investor to consider. Time-
varying opportunities create more factors, as habits or leverage risk aversion shift some
54Milgrom and Stokey (1982).
55Merton (1971), Barberis (2000), Brennan, Schwartz and Lagnado (1997), Campbell and Viceira (1999),
(2002); Pastor (2000); see a revew in Cochrane (2007b).
56See Fama (1996), Cochrane (2007b).
31Figure 17: Multifactor eﬃcient frontiers. Investors minimize variance given mean and co-
variance with the extra factor. A three-fund theorem emerges (left). The market portfolio is
multifactor eﬃcient, but not mean-variance eﬃcient (right).
investor’s risk aversion through time more or less than others. Unpriced factors are even
more important. Our steelworker should start by shorting a steel-industry portfolio, even if
it has zero alpha. Such a zero-alpha factor is actuarially fair insurance. We academics should
understand the variation across people in risks that are hedgeable by systematic factors, and
ﬁnd low-cost portfolios that span that variation.57 Yet we’ve spent all our time looking for
priced factors that are only interesting for the measure-zero mean-variance investor!
All of this sounds hard. That’s good! We ﬁnally have a reason for a fee-based “tailored
portfolio” industry to exist, rather than just to deplore it as folly. We ﬁnally have a reason
for us to charge fat tuitions to our MBA students. We ﬁnally have an interesting portfolio
theory that is not based on chasing zero-sum alpha.
A.1. State Variables
Discount-rate variation means that state-variable hedging should matter. It is almost com-
pletely ignored in practice. Almost all hedge funds, active managers, and institutions still
use mean-variance optimizers. This is particularly striking given that they follow active
strategies, predicated on the idea that expected returns and variances vary a lot over time!
Perhaps state variable hedging seems nebulous, and therefore maybe small and easy to
ignore. Here’s a story to convince you otherwise. Suppose you are a highly risk averse
i n v e s t o r ,w i t ha1 0y e a rh o r i z o n .Y o ua r ei n v e s t i n gt oc o v e rad e ﬁned payment, say your 8
year old’s future tuition at the University of Chicago. The optimal investment is obviously
57Heaton and Lucas (2000).
32a 10-year zero-coupon indexed Treasury (TIP).58 Figure 18 tracks your investment through
time.
Suppose now that bond prices plunge, and volatility surges, highlighted in the graph.
Should you sell in a panic, to avoid the risk of further losses? No. You should tear up
the statement. “Short term volatility” is irrelevant. Every decline in price comes with a
corresponding rise in expected return. Evaluating bonds with a one-period mean-variance,
alpha-beta framework is silly — though a surprising amount of the bond investing world does
it!
























Figure 18: Bond price through time. A cautionary example.
That’s pretty obvious, but now imagine yourself a stock investor in December 2008 — say,
your university’s endowment. Stocks plummeted, shown in Figure 19, and stock volatility
in Figure 20 rose dramatically, from 16% to 70%.
Should you sell, to avoid the risks of further losses? The standard formula says so.
Picking a mean return and risk aversion to justify 60% stocks in normal times, you should















(You might object that mean returns rose too. But they would have to have risen to
4 × 07020182 =6 0 %for this formula to tell you not to change allocation. You also may
58Campbell and Viceira (2001), Wachter (2003).































Figure 19: S&P500 price index in 2008






















Figure 20: Volatility. VIX index, and 20 day realized daily volatility
object that many investors including endowments had leverage, tenured professor salaries to
pay or other habit-like considerations for becoming more risk averse. Fair enough, but then
one-period mean-variance theory is particularly inappropriate in the ﬁrst place.)
But not everyone can do this — the market didn’t fall 93%. If you’re selling, who is buying?
Is everyone else being stupid? Does it make sense to think that the market irrationally
overvalued in the midst of the ﬁnancial crisis?
The answer, of course, is that one-period mean-variance analysis is completely inappro-
priate. If the world were i.i.d., volatility couldn’t change in the ﬁrst place. Stocks are a
34bit like bonds; price/dividend drops increase expected returns.59 To some extent, “short
run volatility” doesn’t matter to a long-run investor. State-variable hedging matters a lot,
even for simple real-world applications. And, by ICAPM logic, we should therefore expect
multiple priced factors. Time-series predictability should be a strong source of additional
pricing factors in the “cross section,” and aﬀect portfolios.
A.2. Prices and payoﬀs
Or maybe not. Telling our bond investor to hold 10 year zeros because their price happens
to covary properly with state variables for their investment opportunities just completely
confuses the obvious. It’s much clearer to look at the ﬁnal payoﬀ and tell him to ignore price
ﬂuctuations. Maybe dynamic portfolio theory overall might get a lot simpler if we look at
payoﬀ streams rather than looking at dynamic trading strategies that achieve those streams.
If you look at payoﬀ streams, it’s totally obvious that an indexed perpetuity (or annuity)
is the risk-free asset for long-term investors, despite arbitrary time-varying return moments,
just as the ten-year zero was obviously the riskfree asset for my bond investor. It’s interesting
that coupon-only TIPS are perceived to be an exotic product, or a way to speculate on
inﬂation, not the benchmark riskfree asset for every portfolio in place of a money-market
investment.

















it turns out that we can still use two-period mean-variance theory to think about streams
of payoﬀs, (loosely, streams of dividends) no matter how much expected returns vary over
time.
Every optimal payoﬀ stream combines an indexed perpetuity and a claim to the aggregate
dividend stream. Less risk averse investors hold more of the claim to aggregate dividends,
and vice versa.
Optimal payoﬀs lie on a long-run mean / long-run variance frontier,w h e r e I d e ﬁne “long








State variables disappear from portfolio theory, just as they did for our 10 year TIP
investor, once he looked at the 10 year problem.
If our stock market investor thought this way, he would answer “I bought the aggregate
dividend stream. Why should I buy or sell? I don’t look at the statements.” This is a lot
59Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004).
60Results from Cochrane (2008).
35simpler to explain and implement than deep time series modeling, value function calculation,
and optimal hedge portfolios!
If investors have outside income, they ﬁrst short a payoﬀ stream most correlated with
their outside income stream, and then hold the mean-variance eﬃcient payoﬀs. Calculating
correlations of income streams this way may be easier than trying to impute discount-rate
induced changes in the present value of outside income streams, in order to calculate return-
based hedge portfolios.
If investors have no outside income, long-run expected returns (payoﬀs divided by initial
prices) line up with long-run market betas. A CAPM emerges, despite arbitrary time-
variation in expected returns and variances. ICAPM pricing factors fade away as we look
at longer horizons. If investors do have outside income, an average-outside-income payoﬀ
emerges as a second priced factor, in the style of Fama and French’s (1996) human capital
story for the value eﬀect.
Of course, quadratic utility is a troublesome approximation, especially for long-term
problems. Still, this simple example captures the possibility that a price and payoﬀ approach
can give a much simpler view of pricing and portfolio theory than we get by focusing on
the high-frequency dynamic trading strategy that achieves those payoﬀsi nag i v e nm a r k e t
structure.
B. Alphas, betas, performance evaluation
In the 1970 view, there is one source of systematic risk, the market index. Active management
chases “alpha,” which means uncovering ineﬃciently-priced assets.
Now we have dozens of dimensions of systematic risks. Many hedge fund strategies
include an element of option writing. For example, Figure 21 shows the annual returns of
“equity-market-neutral” hedge funds together with the market return. “Providing liquidity”
looks a lot like writing out-of-the-money puts61!
I tried telling a hedge fund manager, “You don’t have alpha. I can replicate your returns
with a value-growth, momentum, currency and term carry, and short-vol strategy.” He said,
“‘Exotic beta’ is my alpha. I understand those systematic factors and know how to trade
them. You don’t.” He has a point. How many investors have even thought through their
exposures to carry trade or short volatility “systematic risks,” let alone actually can program
computers to execute such strategies as “passive,” mechanical investments? To an investor
who hasn’t heard of it and holds the market index, a new factor is alpha. And has nothing
to do with informational ineﬃciency.
Most active management and performance evaluation just isn’t well described by the
alpha-beta, information-systematic, selection-style split anymore. There is no “alpha.” There
is just beta you understand and beta you don’t understand, and beta you are positioned to
buy vs. beta you are already exposed to and should sell.
61Mitchell and Pulvino (2001), Asness, Krail and Liew (2001), Agarwal,and Naik (2004).

















Figure 21: One year excess returns of the “equity market neutral” hedge fund index and the
CRSP value-weighted portfolio. Data source: hedgeindex.com and CRSP.
C. Procedures, corporate, accounting, regulation
Time-varying discount rates and multiple factors deeply change many applications.
The ﬁrst slide in a capital budgeting lecture looks something like this
Value of investment =
Expected payout
 +  [() − ]

with a 6% market premium. All of which, we now know, is completely wrong. The market
premium isn’t always 6%, but varies over time by as much as its mean. Expected returns
don’t line up with CAPM betas, but rather with multifactor betas. And since expected
r e t u r n sc h a n g eo v e rt i m e ,t h ed i s c o u n tr a t ei sd i ﬀerent for cashﬂows at diﬀerent horizons.
It’s interesting that investment decisions got so close to right anyway, with high invest-
ment following high stock prices. (Remember Figure 10.) Evidently, a generation of our
MBAs ﬁgured out how to jigger the numbers and get the right answer despite a dramatically
wrong model. Perhaps what we often call “irrational” cash ﬂow forecasts, optimistic in good
times and pessimistic in bad times, are just a good way to oﬀset artiﬁcially constant discount
rates. Or perhaps they understood the Q theory lecture and just follow its advice.
I don’t think the answer lies in multifactor betas62 or discounting with dynamic present
value models and time-varying risk premia, at least not yet. Capital budgeting is a “relative
pricing” exercise — we want to use available information in asset markets to help us decide
what the discount rate for a given project should be. For this purpose, simply looking
at average returns of “similar” securities is enough. Understanding discount rates as a
function of characteristics — or, better, understanding valuations directly as a function of
62Fama and French (1997) try.
37characteristics (the use of “comparables”) — may end up being more fruitful. We don’t
have to explain discount rates — relate expected returns to betas, and understand their deep
economics — in order to use them. We don’t need an all-purpose model of everything to
extend prices from known assets to a new one. Even when discount rates are explained,
the characterization (characteristic models) may be a better measure for practical relative-
pricing than the explanation (beta models). Conversely, capital budgeting gives the same
answer if discount rates are “wrong.” When you shop for a salad, all you care about is
the price of tomatoes. Whether tomatoes are expensive because the trucks got stuck in bad
weather, or because of an irrational bubble in the tomato futures market makes no diﬀerence
to your decision.
Many procedures in accounting, regulation and capital structure implicitly assume that
returns are independent over time, and hence that prices only reﬂect cashﬂow information.
Suppose that a ﬁrm has a single cashﬂow in 10 years, and is funded by a zero-coupon bond
and equity. In most accounting, capital structure, and regulation we would use the stock
and bond prices to calculate the probability and distance to default. But if prices decline
because discount rates rise, that fact has no implication for the probability or distance to
default.
Perhaps banks’ complaint that low asset prices represent “illiquidity” or “temporarily
depressed valuations” rather than insolvency — a lesser chance of making future interest and
principal repayments — make some sense. Perhaps capital requirements do not have to
respond immediately to such events. Perhaps “hold to maturity” accounting is not as silly
as it sounds. Perhaps the fact that ﬁrms change capital structures very slowly in response
to changes in equity valuations makes some sense.63
Of course, in such an event the risk-neutral probability of default has risen. Maybe
regulators, bondholders, and capital structure should respond to a rise in the state-price
of the default event exactly as they respond to a rise in the real probability of that event.
Maybe, but at least it’s a very diﬀerent issue and worth asking the question.
I am not arguing that mark-to-market accounting is bad, or that fudging the numbers
is a good idea. The point is only that what you do with a mark-to-market number might
be quite diﬀerent in a world driven by discount-rate variation than one driven by cashﬂow
variation.64 The mark-to-market value is no longer a suﬃcient statistic. A loss of value
with a rise in expected return has diﬀerent implications than a loss of value with a decline
in expected return. Decisions need to incorporate more information, not less
The view that the stock price is driven by expected earnings lies behind stock-based
executive compensation as well. It’s already a bit of a puzzle that executives should be
forced to hold the “systematic” risks due to recessions, market betas, or commodity-price
exposures, about which they can do nothing. Understanding that a large fraction of stock
returns reﬂect changes in discount rates or new-factor beta exposures makes the logic of such
incentives even more curious. Perhaps stock-based compensation has less to do with eﬀort
and operating performance, but more with incentives for risk management or tax treatment.
63Welch (2004).
64Heaton, Lucas and McDonald (2009).
38D. Macroeconomics
Large variation in risk premia implies exciting changes for macroeconomics.
Most of macroeconomics focuses on variation in a single intertemporal price, “the” inter-
est rate, which intermediates saving and investment. Yet in the recent recession, as shown
in Figure 11, interest rates paid by borrowers (and received by any investors willing to lend)
spiked up, while short-term government rates went down. Recessions are all about changes
in credit spreads, about the willingness to bear risk and the amount of risk to be borne, far
more than they are about changes in the desire for current vs. future certain consumption.
Most of the Federal Reserve’s response consisted of targeting risk premiums, not changing
the level of interest rates or addressing a transactions demand for money.
Macroeconomics and ﬁnance have thought very diﬀerently about consumer (we call them
investors) and ﬁrm behavior. For example, the consumers in the Cambpell and Cochrane
(1999) habit model balance very strong precautionary saving motives with very strong
intertemporal substitution motives, and have large and time-varying risk aversion. Their
behavior is very far from the permanent-income intuition (or constrained alternative) in
macroeconomic thinking.
As one simple story, macroeconomists often think about how consumers will respond
to a change in “wealth,” coming from a change in stock prices or house prices. Financial
economists might suspect that consumers will respond quite diﬀerently to a decline in value
c o m i n gf r o mad i s c o u n tr a t er i s e—at e m p o r a r yc h a n g ei np r i c ew i t hn oc h a n g ei nc a p i t a l
stock or cashﬂow — than one that comes from a change in expected cashﬂows, or destruction
of physical capital stock.
Financial models also emphasize adjustment costs or irreversibilities: If ﬁrms can freely
transform consumption goods to capital, then stock prices (q) are constant. Yet, most “real
business cycle” literature following King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988) left out adjustment
costs, because they didn’t need them to match basic quantity correlations. The ﬁrst round
of “new-Keynesian” literature abstracted from capital altogether, and much work in that
tradition continues to do so. Figure 10 pretty strongly suggests q is not constant. Together
with the regression evidence of Table I, and interest rates in Figure 11, it suggests that
variations in the risk premium drive investment, not variation in the level of riskfree interest
rates emphasized by macro policy-makers. Adjustment costs lead to basic diﬀerences in
analysis. For example, without adjustment costs, the marginal product of capital 0() can
be negative, clashing with the zero bound on nominal rates. With adjustment costs, the
price of capital can fall, giving a positive real rate of interest.
Formal macroeconomics has started to introduce some of the same ingredients that macro-
ﬁnance researchers are using to understand discount rate variation, including “new” prefer-
ences, adjustment cost or other frictions in capital formation, and ﬁnancial frictions in credit
markets.65 And macroeconomic models with ﬁnancial frictions are all the rage since the
65For example Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). However, this is also a good example of remain-
ing diﬀerences. They use a one-period habit, which does not generate slow-moving expected excess returns,
a n da na d j u s t m e n tc o s tt i e dt oi n v e s t m e n tg r o w t hn o tt h e investment/capital ratio, which does not generate
the q theory predictions of Figure 10 and related ﬁnance literature.
39ﬁnancial crisis. Still, we are a long way from a single general-equilibrium model that matches
basic quantity and price facts.
Everyone is aware of the question. The job is just hard. Macroeconomic models are
technically complicated. Macroeconomic models with time varying risk premia are much
harder. Adding ﬁnancial frictions while maintaining the models’ dynamic intertemporal
character is harder still. At a deeper level, successful “grand synthesis” models do not
consist of just mixing all the popular ingredients together and stirring the pot; they must
maintain the clear quantitative-parable feature of good economic analysis.
An asset-pricing perspective also informs the interaction between monetary and ﬁscal
policy. From a ﬁnance perspective, nominal government debt is “equity” in the government:
it is the residual claim to primary ﬁscal surpluses. Hence, the price level must satisfy the






+ (real primary surplus+) (10)
Inﬂation can absorb shocks to surpluses, just as as equity absorbs shocks to proﬁts t r e a m s .
This fact is at least an important constraint on monetary policy, especially in a time of
looming deﬁcits.66 Fiscal events can lead to inﬂation that the Fed is powerless to avoid.
The analogy to stocks also suggests that variation in the discount rate + for government
debt is important: A “ﬂight to quality” lowers the discount rate for government debt, raising
the right hand side of (10). People want to hold more government debt, which means getting
rid of goods and services, i.e. lower aggregate demand. This story links the “rising risk
premium” which ﬁnance people see as the core of a recession with the “decline in aggregate
demand” which macroeconomists see. The standard corporate ﬁnance perspective also
illuminates government debt maturity structure and denomination: Foreign currency debt
is debt, that must be repaid or defaulted. Domestic-currency debt is equity, which can be
inﬂated. Long-term debt allows bond prices to temporarily absorb shocks to future surpluses,
postponing the immediate inﬂation when short-term debt cannot be reﬁnanced.
VI. Conclusion
Discount rates vary a lot more than we thought. Most of the puzzles and anomalies that we
face amount to discount rate variation we don’t understand. Our theoretical controversies
are about how discount rates are formed. We need to recognize and incorporate discount
rate variation in applied procedures.
We are really only beginning these tasks. The facts about discount rate variation need
at least a dramatic consolidation. Theories are in their infancy. And most applications still
implicitly assume i.i.d. returns and the CAPM, and therefore that price changes only reveal
cashﬂow news. Throughout, I see hints that discount-rate variation may lead us to refocus
analysis on prices and long-run payoﬀ streams rather than one-period returns.
66Sargent and Wallace (1981), Cochrane (2011).
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49Appendix
I. Present values and identities
A. Return identity
To keep the presentation self-contained, I start with a derivation of the Campbell-Shiller














Therefore the log return is




+  + ∆+1
where  ≡ log(),  =l o g ( )  =l o g ( ). I Taylor expand the ﬁrst term about
ac o n s t a n t  and  = −log() This constant need not be the mean. One can use
the identity to examine cross-sectional variation in dividend yields without using a diﬀerent
constant of approximation for securities with diﬀerent average dividend yield.
+1 =l o g ( 1+) −

1+
(+1 − )+ + ∆+1
Denoting  ≡ 
1+, we can write the approximation
+1 =  − +1 +  + ∆+1 (11)
where
 = −(1 − )log(1− ) − log()
In time-series applications where we will only consider second moments we interpret symbols
as deviations from means and ignore  leaving
+1 = −+1 +  + ∆+1 (12)
B. Present value identity.
To derive the present value identity (1), rearrange the return identity as












Assuming the latter term goes to zero — the “transversality condition” which rules out










This is an ex-post identity, so it also holds in conditional expectations using any information
set.
C. Dividend construction.















By using an annual horizon, I avoid the strong seasonal in dividend payments.
Annual dividend growth also includes some return information, because this deﬁnition
one reinvests dividends to the end of the year at the market return. Annual sums of dividends
are a good deal less volatile. However, if one uses sums of dividends over the year, then the
identity +1 =( +1 + +1) does not hold. It’s nice to use data deﬁnitions for which
identities hold!
This deﬁnition of dividends has a second practical advantage. Consider the sharp fall in
stocks in the Fall of 2008. Using a simple sum of past dividends, we would see a decline in
price/dividend ratio as large as the decline in stock market values. But much of that decline
surely reﬂected news that dividends in 2009 were going to fall dramatically, news reﬂected
in the return. By reinvesting dividends to the end of the year, the “dividend” series is lower
than the sum; this price-dividend ratio already includes the information that dividends will
decline next year. The price-dividend ratio fell a good deal less than prices, and therefore
better corresponds to expected returns.







51For the VAR in Tables II-IV I use instead dividend growth implied by the identity (11),
∆+1 =  + +1 + +1 − 
Actual dividend growth gives very similar results. However, this construction means that
Cambpell-Shiller approximate identities hold exactly, so it is easier to see the identities in the
results. To make identities hold, it’s better to use “pure” returns rather than infer returns




Ii d e n t i ﬁed the shocks in Figure 5 by setting changes to the other variables in turn equal
to zero. The return identity (12) means that therefore some of the shocks must come with
contemporaneous shocks to returns.
The dividend growth shock is a shock to dividend growth with no change in dividend










If dividend growth rises and dividend yields do not change, you just made a good return.
The dividend yield shock has no change in dividend growth or cay. If dividends don’t change
and  rises, it means  and  fell a lot. Intuitively, a pure rise in discount rates lowers










The cay shock is a change in  with no change in dividend yield  or dividend growth










I choose this deﬁnition of shocks because it leads to nicely interpretable responses, e.g.
“cashﬂow” and “discount rate.” Because dividends remain roughly unpredictable, this “short
run” identiﬁcation gives almost the same result as a “long run” identiﬁcation. Precisely, if










we would have gotten nearly the same result. The resulting shocks are nearly uncorrelated,
which is also convenient.
52This VAR is very simple, since I left dividend growth and returns out of the right hand
side. My purpose is to distill the essential message of more complex VARs, not to deny that
there may be some information in additional lags of these variables.
B. Identities in the cay VAR.
















suggests that an extra variable can only help dp to forecast long horizon returns if it forecasts
l o n gh o r i z o nd i v i d e n dg r o w t h ;i tc a nh e l pt of o r e c a s to n ey e a rr e t u r n sb yc h a n g i n gt h et e r m
structure of return forecasts as well. Here I show how that intuition applies algebraically to
multiple regression coeﬃcients and the impulse response function.
Regressing both sides of (13) on  and , we obtain the generalized restriction on


















−1+ =  + 

  + 









−1∆+ =  + 

  + 

  + 

Equation (14) is the same as before, now applied to the multiple regression coeﬃcient.
Equation (15) expresses the idea that a new variable can only help to forecast long-run
returns if it also helps to forecast long-run dividend growth. The extra dividend growth and
return forecasts will be perfectly negatively correlated. In this way, extra long-run dividend
growth forecastability means more long-run return forecastability, not less.
In terms of individual long-horizon regressions
+ = 
()
  + 
()
  + 

+



























A variable can help to forecast one-year returns, 
(1)
 6=0only if it correspondingly changes
the forecast of longer-horizon returns, or dividend growth.
Since impluse-response functions are the same as regression coeﬃcients of future variables





























→ denotes the response of + to a  shock. This fact lets me easily interpret
the change in forecastability by adding cay, in the context of the present value identity, by
plotting the impulse responses. The numbers in Figure 5 are terms of this decomposition.
C. Results using Welch-Goyal predictors
To see if the pattern of the cay VAR holds more generally, I tried a number of the forecasting
variables in Welch and Goyal (2008). The results are in Table AI. Each of these variables
helps substantially to forecast one-period returns. Yet they mean-revert quickly and don’t
forecast dividends much, so the contribution to the variance of dividend yields is still almost
all from the variance of long-run expected returns.
dp cay eqis svar ik dfy
 2.21 -0.71 1.48 -5.30 5.25
() (1.73) (-2.53) (3.40) (-0.85) (1.86)
 0.13 0.10 0.19 0.15 0.11 0.13
() (2.61) (1.82) (3.75) (3.05) (2.16) (2.53)
2 0.10 0.16 0.19 0.15 0.11 0.13
(Σ∞
=1−1+) 0.52 0.46 0.49 0.42 0.53 0.49
(Σ∞
=1−1∆+) 0.17 0.13 0.16 0.11 0.17 0.14
Table AI. Multiple return-forecasting regressions and implied variance of long-
horizon returns.
+1 =  +  ×  +  ×  + +1
54Data are from Welch and Goyal, 1947-2009. I calculate the variance of long-
horizon expected returns and dividend growth from a bivariate VAR, and using
actual (not identity) dividend growth forecasts. Equis, Percentage Equity Is-
suance is the ratio of equity issuing activity as a fraction of total issuing activity.
Svar is stock variance, computed as sum of squared daily returns on the S&P
500. Ik is the investment to capital ratio, the ratio of aggregate (private nonres-
idential ﬁxed) investment to aggregate capital for the whole economy. Dfy, the
default yield spread, is the diﬀerence between BAA and AAA-rated corporate
bond yields.
D. More lags of dividend growth and returns
An obvious ﬁr s ts o u r c eo fa d d i t i o n a lv a r i a b l e si sl e s sr e s t r i c t i v eV A R st h a nt h es i m p l eﬁrst-
order VAR that I presented in the text. Even in the information set of lagged { ∆},
there may be more information. As usual in VARs individual coeﬃcients largely enter
insigniﬁcantly, so it takes some art or prior information to see robust patterns.
The second lag of dividend yields is at least economically important. Table AII presents
the regressions.
 ∆ () (∆) 2 (())%
(())
()
+1 0.13 0.26 (2.45) (1.83) 0.15 6.76 0.65
∆+1 0.03 0.35 (0.62) (3.27) 0.14 4.98 0.90
+1 0.93 0.10 (24.7) (0.85) 0.91
∆+1 -0.07 0.10 (-1.85) (0.85) 0.06
Table AII. Forecasts using dividend yield and change in dividend yield. CRSP
value weighted return 1947-2009. ∆ =  − −1
The change in dividend yield helps the return forecast, increasing 2 from 0.09 to 0.15,
and correspondingly increasing the more interesting measures of expected return variation.
The change in dividend yield really helps to forecast dividend growth, with a 3.27 t
statistic, 5% standard deviation of forecast and forecast that varies by 90% of the mean.
The 0.10 autoccorrelation in ∆ however suggests that this will be a very short-lived
signal, one with little impact on forecasts of long-run dividend growth or returns, and thus
to our view of the sources of price-dividend ratio volatility.
Similarly, while individual − and ∆− coeﬃcients don’t look big and don’t have much
pattern, they can nonetheless help as a group, or by sensibly restricting the pattern of lagged
coeﬃcients. In this vein, Lacerda and Santa-Clara (2010) and Koijen and van Binsbergen
(2009) ﬁnd that moving averages of past dividend growth help to forecast both returns
and dividend growth (as they must, given the present value identity), almost doubling the
return-forecast 2.
55E. VAR calculations
To ﬁnd regression coeﬃcients implied by a ﬁrst-order VAR as in Table II, I run
+1 =  + 

+1 (16)
∆+1 =  + 

+1








































































While extending the VAR to additional variables adds a lot, the univariate implications of the
VARs are much less than one might think. The middle panel of Figure 5 implies a completely
temporary component of prices; if prices fall and dividends do not, that price movement is
expected completely to melt away. However, the implied univariate representation of returns
is almost completely independent over time. Returns are predictable by dividend yields, but
not by past returns. As a result, stock return volatility does not decline substantially with
i n v e s t m e n th o r i z o na n ds t o c k sa r en o ts a f e ri nt h el o n gr u n . O n eh a st os e et h es t a t ev a r i a b l e
 to have any eﬀect on forecastability or classic portfolio theory.
The reason is easy to see in a simpliﬁed example. Write the VAR as
+1 =  ×  + 

+1
∆+1 =0 ×  + 

+1
+1 =  ×  + 

+1








 =1 −  +0 
56Examine (1 − )+1
































Thus, +1 is an ARMA(1,1) in its univariate representation,
(1 − )+1 =( 1− )+1
Now,  ≈ 096 and ˆ  ≈ 094, and is biased down. Hence  =  is a good approximation. In



























Hence,  =  and returns are uncorrelated over time,
+1 = +1

2(+1 + +2 +  + +)=
2
2()
In general, with  6= , we still have  very near  (between  and  in fact), so returns
follow an ARMA with very slight mean-reversion and a large permanent component.
III. Asset Pricing as a function of characteristics
A. Portfolio spreads
In the text, I related 1-10 portfolio means to Sharpe ratios of underlying factors. Here is
the result. Consider the ideal world for such an investigation: Expected returns rise with a
characteristic  (for example b/m)
(
)= +  × 




 ×  + 











































where  is the number of securities in each portfolio. Therefore, the Sharpe ratio, which is
proportional to the t statistic
√
















This Sharpe ratio rises as we look at further separated portfolios. As  −  increases,
it approaches the pure Sharpe ratio of the factor ()(). It does not increase forever.
Splitting in to ﬁner portfolios can get the magic 1% per month portfolio mean or alpha,
but cannot arbitrarily raise Sharpe ratios or t statistics. Splitting the portfolio more ﬁnely
reduces , so splits that are too ﬁne end up reducing the Sharpe ratio and t statistic by
including too much idiosyncratic risk.
Having seen this analysis, of course, we see that it’s more eﬃcient simply to examine
the statistical signiﬁcance of the cross-sectional regression coeﬃcient ˆ , which uses informa-
tion in all the securities, not just the end portfolios. Since ˆ  = (())()=
( × [ − ()])() this regression coeﬃcient is the same thing as testing the
mean () of a factor which is also formed as a linear function of the characteristic  =

 × [ − ()].
B. Value, betas, and samples.
In the text, I emphasized that all puzzles are joint puzzles of expected returns and betas,
and cautioned that the value puzzle does not hold in pre - 1963 US data. Figure 22 presents
the CAPM in the Fama-French 10 book/market portfolios before and after 1963. In the left
hand panel, you see the familiar failure of the CAPM — average returns are higher in the
value portfolio, but there is no association between the wide spread in average returns and
market betas. The right-and panel shows average returns and betas before 1963. Here the
CAPM is working remarkably well. The big change is not in the pattern of average returns.
Value still earns more than growth. The big change is betas — in the pre-63 period value
ﬁr m sh a v eh i g h e rb e t a s ,j u s ta st h e y“ o u g h t ”t od o . 67
67Davis, Fama, and French (2000), Cambpell and Vuolteenaho (2004), Ang and Chen (2007), Fama and
French (2006).
















































Figure 22: Value eﬀect before and after 1963. Average returns on Fama - French 10 portfolios
sorted by book/market equity vs. CAPM betas. Monthly data. Source: Ken French’s
website.
C. Time series and cross section
As a ﬁrst step towards understanding mean returns as a function of characteristics, and
to help make the ideas concrete, Table AIII presents regressions using the Fama-French 25
size and book-market portfolios. I use log book/market and log size relative to the market
portfolio.
The ﬁrst row of Table AIII gives a pure cross-sectional regression. The ﬁtted values of
this regression ﬁt the portfolio average returns quite well, with a 77% 2 (One does better
still with a × cross-term, allowing the growth portfolios to have a diﬀerent slope on
size than the value portfolios.)
size bm ∆size ∆bm
1. Cross section -0.030 0.27
2. Pooled -0.022 0.55
3. Time dummies -0.031 0.29
4. Portfolio dummies -0.087 1.48
5. Pooled -0.030 0.46 -0.38 1.11
Table AIII. Regressions of Fama-French 25 size and B/M portfolio returns on








=  +  ×  ()+ × ()+;  =1 225




59Terms in parentheses only appear in some regressions.  is log(market eq-
uity/total market equity).  is log(book/market). Monthly data 1947-2009.
Data from Ken French’s website.
The second row of Table AIII gives a pooled forecasting regression, which is the most
natural way to integrate time series and cross section. The size coeﬃcient is a little smaller,
and the bm coeﬃcient is much larger.
To diagnose the diﬀerence between the cross-section and pooled regressions, rows 3 and 4
present a regression with time dummies and a regression with portfolio dummies. Variation
over time in a given portfolio’s bm is a much stronger signal of return variation than the
same size variation across portfolios in average bm.
When we run such regressions for individual ﬁrms, we can’t use dummies, since the
average return of a speciﬁc company over the whole sample is meaningless. The goal of this
regression is to mirror portfolio formation and remove ﬁrm-name completely from the list of
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .T h el a s tl i n eo fT a b l eA I I Ig i v e saw a yt oc a p t u r et h ed i ﬀerence between time-
series and cross section without dummies — it allows an independent eﬀect of recent changes
in the characteristics. This speciﬁcation accounts quite well for the otherwise unpalatable
time and portfolio dummies. The portfolio dummy regression coeﬃcient that captures time-
series variation is quite similar to the sum of the level and recent-change coeﬃcients. It is
also gratifyingly similar to the “recent-change” eﬀect in aggregate dividend-yield regressions
o fT a b l eA I I .O n ec o u l do fc o u r s ec a p t u r et h es ame phenomenon with portfolios, by sorting
based on level and recent change of characteristics. But my goal is to explore the other
direction of this equivalence.
Next, we want to run regressions like this on individual data, and ﬁnd similar charac-
terization of the covariance matrix as a function of characteristics. Then, we can expand to
multiple right-hand variables.
D. Prices in the cross section
Section C suggested merging time-series and cross-sectional approaches, to understand the
variation in prices (price-dividend ratios) across time and portfolios by exploring long-run
return predictability in the cross-section. How much of the diﬀerence between one asset’s
price-dividend, price-earnings, book-market, etc. ratio and another’s is due to variation in
expected returns, and how much to expected dividend growth or other cashﬂow expecta-
tions?68
To explore this question and clarify the idea, I examine the 10 Fama-French book/market
portfolios. Eventually, we’re looking for an estimates that are functions of size and other
characteristics in individual data. Figure 23 presents the average return, dividend growth,
and dividend yield of the portfolios.
Over long horizons, dividend yields are stationary so long-term average returns come from
dividend yields and dividend growth. Taking unconditional means of the return identity (12),
68Vuolteenaho (2002), Cohen, Polk and Vuolteenaho (2003).















Figure 23: Average return +1, dividend growth ∆+1, and dividend yield  for the Fama
- French 10 book/market portfolios, 1947-2008. The dashed ∆ line gives mean dividend
growth implied by the approximate identity ∆+1 = +1 −  + +1 − 











Figure 23 shows that value portfolio returns come roughly half from greater dividend growth
and half from a larger average dividend yield.
Our objective is to produce variance decompositions across time and securities as with

















The same observation corresponds to a fairly extreme version of the usual surprising result
Low prices — high dividend yields — correspond to high dividend growth, and thus to even
higher returns.69
The ﬁrst column of Table AIV expresses the same idea in a purely cross-sectional regres-










where the  are the cross-sectional regression coeﬃcients of the terms in (18). We can
interpret these coeﬃcients as the fraction of cross-sectional dividend yield variation driven
69Chen, Petkova and Zhang (2008) section 2.2.2 discuss this puzzle.
61by discount rates and driven by dividend growth. (Vuolteenaho (2002) uses a diﬀerent
present value identity to understand variation in the book / market ratio directly, rather
than use dividend yields as I have. This is a better procedure for individual stocks, which
often do not pay dividends. I use dividend yields here for simplicity.) The results are quite
similar to the time-series regressions for the market portfolio from Tables 2 - 4: More than
all of the cross-sectional variation in average dividend yields of these portfolios comes from
cross-sectional variation in expected returns (1.33). Expected dividend growth goes “the
wrong way” — low prices correspond to high dividend growth, as seen in Figure 23. (Sample


































T h el a s tt e r mi sn o tz e r o ,w h i c hi sw h yt h ec o e ﬃcients in the (1 − ) column do not add
up following (19).)






 0.053 1.33 0.107 0.90 0.044 0.33 0.095 0.97 0.090 0.074
∆ 0.026 0.64 -0.011 -0.10 -0.092 -0.68 -0.003 -0.03 -0.012 0.076
 0.92 0.90 0.94 0.94 0.002
Table AIV. Cross-sectional regression coeﬃcients of average returns (
+1),
average dividend growth (∆+1), and dividend yield change on dividend yields
(), 10 Fama-French B/M portfolios. Implied dividend growth ∆ is cal-
culated from the approximate identity ∆+1 = +1 −  + +1 − .I u s e
 =0 96
We can, of course, ask how much of the time-variation in these dividend yields around
their portfolio average corresponds to return vs. dividend growth forecasts. A regression
that includes portfolio dummies, shown next in Table AIV, addresses this question. The
0.11 return-forecasting coeﬃcient for portfolios is almost the same as the return forecasting
coeﬃc i e n tf o rt h em a r k e ta saw h o l es e e ni nT a b l e sI I - I V . T h ed i v i d e n d - g r o w t hf o r e c a s ti s
also nearly zero. So all variation in book/market sorted portfolio dividend yields over time,
about portfolio means, corresponds to variation in expected returns, much like that of market
returns.
The regression with time dummies, next in Table AIV, paints a diﬀerent picture. The
return coeﬃcient is smaller at 0.044, and  is smaller as well, so expected returns only
account for 33% of the variation in dividend yields. Finally we see an important dividend
growth forecast, with the right sign, -0.09, accounting for 68% of dividend yield volatility.
The strong contrast of this result with the pure cross sectional regression means that a time
of unusually large cross-sectional dispersion in dividend yields corresponds to an unusually
high dispersion in dividend growth forecasts.
62This is an important regression, in that it gives us a sense that there is a component
of variation in valuations that does correspond to dividend growth forecasts. The unusual
dispersion in dividend growth forecasts adds up to zero, so this kind of variation cannot
be seen in the aggregate dividend yield and its forecasting relations. There is variation
in forecastable dividend growth, which drives some individual variation in dividend/price
ratios. But it averages out across all securities, so that the aggregate dividend yield is driven
primarily by expected returns.
A pooled regression with no dummies looks much like the time-series regression with
portfolio dummies. There is more time-variation in dividend yields than cross-sectional
variation, so adding them up evenly the time-variation dominates the pooled regression.
The last column of Table AIV follows Table AIII, to try to unite time-series and cross-
sectional variation without using dummies. It shows a very similar result, with the ∆−1
variable accounting for much of the dividend growth forecastability. The next step is to
calculate the price implications of this multivariate regression, as I did with cay, but that
t a k e su st o of a ra ﬁe l do ft h i ss i m p l ee x a m p l e .
The Fama-French size portfolios, shown in Table AV, paint a quite diﬀerent picture. The
pure cross-sectional regression (ﬁrst column) shows cashﬂow eﬀects: Higher pieces (low div-
idend yields) are associated with higher subsequent dividend growth, which by one measure
fully accounts for the dividend yield variation! However, with portfolio dummies we again
see that practically all dividend yield variation over time for a given portfolio comes from
expected return variation, just as for the market as a whole. With time dummies, variation
across portfolios in a given time period is split between return and dividend growth forecasts.






 -0.014 -0.36 0.077 1.02 0.023 0.27 0.067 0.95
∆ -0.048 -1.20 0.002 0.02 -0.063 -0.73 -0.004 -0.05
 0.963 0.952 0.968
Table AV. Cross-sectional regression coeﬃcients of average returns (
+1),
average dividend growth (∆
+1), and dividend yield change on dividend yields
(), 10 Fama-French ME (size) portfolios. Implied dividend growth is calcu-
lated from the approximate identity ∆+1 = +1 −  + +1 − .
63